O.P. Sabherwal**
With ratification of the Hyde Act on Indo-US nuclear cooperation by President Bush, the last hurdles for the nuclear deal to become a reality have to be tackled by the Indian leadership with support from the Bush administration. The two barriers that have still to be crossed are concurrence of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and negotiating an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA. No less challenging is the drawing up of the 123 Agreement – essentially a bilateral Indo-US agreement – spelling out the terms of the nuclear accord binding the two governments.
NSG-Nuclear Suppliers Group
It can reasonably be assumed that the first two hurdles will be successfully dealt with. The friendly – almost partisan – stand of France, Britain and Russia on the Indo-US nuclear accord will smoothen the way to NSG concurrence. In the event, most members of the Group have indicated their willingness to terminate nuclear sanctions imposed on India. Misgivings of the Scandinavian countries apart, the focus is on China and Japan.
All said and done, the Chinese leadership takes an enlightened view on global civilian nuclear issues and has given ample indication that despite its earlier reservations, it will enable NSG to lift nuclear sanctions on India. Although Japan’s support should not be taken for granted, the Prime Minister’s visit to that country has paved the way for a positive stand. New Delhi has however to remove Japan’s lingering doubts that the nuclear deal might be used to boost India’s weapon capability.
IAEA Safeguards
As for IAEA safeguards, negotiations are already on between IAEA Director General Mohammed AlBaradei and the Chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commission, Dr Anil Kakodkar, for working out an India-specific safeguards agreement that has to go with lifting curbs on India for free trade in nuclear material and technology for peaceful applications. Dr AlBaradei is a friend of India and has supported the Indo-US nuclear accord. But working out India-specific IAEA safeguards to fit the new dispensation for India has many complexities and needs careful working out.
IAEA safeguards in this instance are a new variety – neither the safeguards that IAEA applies to the five NPT weapon states nor the full scope intrusive safeguards for non-weapon member states. India’s weapon status is being given tacit acceptance despite its being a NPT non-member. Its civilian and military facilities are being separated: the safeguards will be applicable only on the civilian facilities.
Apprehensions in India about the way IAEA safeguards will be worked, especially in relation to R&D centers and Indian scientists innovation, have to be removed. As of now, IAEA safeguards on India have been limited only to imported nuclear material and plants – Tarapur! and 2, Russian supported VVER light water reactors being built at Kudankulam and the LEU fuel imported for the light water reactors. It is now proposed that in addition to this limited safeguards agreement, an additional India-specific protocol will be drawn up between IAEA and India.
India-Specific Protocol
The civilian facilities listed out in the Indo-US accord will be placed under IAEA safeguards. These include not only the present and future imported nuclear reactors, material and technology, but also 14 of the 22 Indian built (some under construction) civilian reactors, future civilian fast breeder reactors (other than the fast breeder test reactor and the upcoming 500 MWe prototype fast breeder reactor), designated heavy water plants, part of the Nuclear Fuel Complex and civilian R&D complexes – Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre, Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics and the Institute of Plasma Research – and the Prefree Tarapur reprocessing plant.
The nuclear military facilities will not be under IAEA purview and will be entirely for India to operate. It is for India to name its military and civilian facilities. The facilities that India names as military – BARC, Kalpakkam’s IGCAR, FBTR and the upcoming 500 MW prototype Fast Breeder Reactor, supporting infra structure and reprocessing plants – will determine India’s strategic programme, out of IAEA safeguards purview. India is also free to build any fresh military facility to keep its nuclear deterrent in vibrant condition. The shape of the Indian nuclear deterrent is for the Indian government to comprehend and decide – based on its threat perception and global overview.
Major Concerns
Some senior nuclear scientists have criticized the inclusion of R&D centers under the safeguards regime. And also future fast breeder reactors. This they contend will stifle scientific creativity and serve as a conduit leaking Indian innovation abroad. They lay moratorium on nuclear tests should go: further tests are needed for India’s credible nuclear deterrent. Others are critical that not allowing import of enrichment and reprocessing technology by India envisaged in the Hyde Act cripples US nuclear cooperation for India. Aside from the civilian nuclear cooperation, critics apprehend that Indian foreign policy will become a tail of US global interests, as in Iran.
These are major concerns. But there are good reasons to believe that the Indian authorities – political and nuclear establishments – have taken care to deal with the issues raised. The Prime Minister has given clear assurance that innovation and research in R&D centers placed under safeguards will have no constraints. That is what an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA means. As for bringing 14 Indian built reactors and future fast breeder reactors under safeguards, this is all to India’s benefit since curbs on uranium imports will go. There is assurance in the accord announced by President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that uranium supplies for the safeguarded reactors will be available for lifetime, which is a major boost to the Indian nuclear power programme.
It has to be understood that the Indo-US nuclear accord is contained in the two agreements of July 18, 2005 and March 2, 2006, not the Hyde Act. This Act serves as a facilitator. The 123 Agreement between the United States and India is the key requisite to give the Indo-US accord legal shape: the terms of this Agreement will be binding on both governments.
The 123 Agreement
Drawing up the 123 Agreement is thus the most important task, and it should meet all valid concerns, such as the specifics on the provision for uranium imports for the safeguarded nuclear facilities. Reprocessing of spent fuel – a top-end nuclear technology that India along with a select band of countries has mastered – is the corner-stone of the Bhabha-planned three phase thorium power programme, and the core of India’s weapon programme. There can be no limitations on use of Indian built reprocessing plants. This has to be specified in the final Indo-US bilateral agreement, embodied in the 123 Agreement. It is necessary to speedily work out the 123 Agreement on the lines of the two statements of President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.
A New Era
The event will usher in what might be called a new era in India’s nuclear programme. A nuclear renaissance, advancing the target of 20,000 MW nuclear power from 2020 in just five years, is on the anvil. A nuclear renaissance for the Indian economy, giving not only a vital input for India’s growth at a crucial juncture, but also clean energy that does not add to global warming.
*A Senior Journalist specializing in nuclear affairs and is author of the book, India’s Tryst With the Atom
Disclaimer: The views expressed by the author in this feature are entirely his own and not necessarily reflect the views of INVC
